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Zero-knowledge watermark detectors presented to date are based on a linear correlation between the asset features and a given
secret sequence. This detection function is susceptible of being attacked by sensitivity attacks, for which zero-knowledge does not
provide protection. In this paper, an eﬃcient zero-knowledge version of the generalized Gaussian maximum likelihood (ML) de-
tector is introduced. This detector has shown an improved resilience against sensitivity attacks, that is empirically corroborated in
the present work. Two versions of the zero-knowledge detector are presented; the first one makes use of two new zero-knowledge
proofs for absolute value and square root calculation; the second is an improved version applicable when the spreading sequence
is binary, and it has minimum communication complexity. Completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties of the de-
veloped protocols are proved, and they are compared with previous zero-knowledge watermark detection protocols in terms of
receiver operating characteristic, resistance to sensitivity attacks, and communication complexity.
Copyright © 2007 J. R. Troncoso-Pastoriza and F. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Watermarking technology has emerged as a solution for au-
thorship proofs or dispute resolving. In these applications,
there are several requirements that watermarking schemes
must fulfill, like imperceptibility, robustness to attacks that
try to erase a legally inserted watermark or to embed an ille-
gal watermark in some asset, and they must also be secure to
the disclosure of information that could allow the breakage
of the whole system by unauthorized parties.
The schemes that have been used up to now are symmet-
ric, as they employ the same key for watermark embedding
and watermark detection; thus, such key must be given to
the party that runs the detector, which in most cases is not
trusted. In order to satisfy the security requirements, two ap-
proaches have been proposed: the first one, called asymmet-
ric watermarking, follows the paradigm of asymmetric cryp-
tosystems, and employs diﬀerent keys for embedding and de-
tection; the second approach, zero-knowledge watermarking,
makes use of zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols [1] in order to
get a secure communication layer over a pre-existent sym-
metric protocol. In zero-knowledge watermark detection [2],
a prover P tries to demonstrate to a verifier V the presence
of a watermark in a given asset. Commitment schemes [3]
are used to conceal the secret information, so that detection
is performed without providing to V any information addi-
tional to the presence of the watermark.
Nevertheless, such minimum disclosure of information
still allows for blind sensitivity attacks [4], that have arisen
as very harmful attacks for methods that present simple de-
tection boundaries. The ZK detection protocols presented to
date—Adelsbach and Sadeghi [2] and Piva et al. [5]—are
based on correlation detectors, for which blind sensitivity at-
tacks are especially eﬃcient.
In this paper, a new zero-knowledge blind watermark de-
tection protocol is presented; it is based on the spread spec-
trum detector by Herna´ndez et al. [6], which is optimal for
additive watermarking in generalized Gaussian distributed
host features (e.g., AC DCT coeﬃcients of images). The ro-
bustness to sensitivity attacks comes from the complexity
of the detection boundary for certain shape factors. Thus,
when combined with zero-knowledge, it becomes secure and
robust. This protocol will be compared in terms of perfor-
mance and eﬃciency with the previous ZK protocols based
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on additive spread-spectrum and Spread-Transform Dither
Modulation (ST-DM), and rewritten in a form that greatly
improves its communication and computation complexity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
some basics about zero-knowledge and watermark detec-
tion are reviewed, and the three studied detectors are com-
pared, pointing out the improved robustness of the GG de-
tector against sensitivity attacks. In Section 3, the needed ZK
subprotocols are enumerated, along with their communi-
cation complexity and a detailed description of the devel-
oped proofs. Sections 4 and 5 detail the complete detection
protocol and the improved version for a binary antipodal
spreading sequence. Section 6 presents the security analy-
sis for these protocols; complexity and implementation con-
cerns are discussed in Section 7. Finally, some conclusions
are drawn in Section 8.
2. NOTATION AND PREVIOUS CONCEPTS
In this section, some of the concepts needed for the develop-
ment of the studied protocols are briefly introduced. Bold-
face lower-case letters will denote column vectors of length
L, whereas boldface capital letters are used for matrices, and
scalar variables will be denoted by italicized letters. Upper-




Commitment schemes [3] are cryptographic tools that, given
a common public parameter parcom, allow that one party of
a protocol choose a determined value m from a finite set M
and commit to his choice Cm = Com(m, r, parcom), such that
he cannot modify it during the rest of the protocol; the com-
mitted value is not disclosed to the other party, thanks to the
randomization produced by r, which constitutes the secret
information needed to open the commitment.
The required security properties that the commit func-
tion must fulfill are binding and hiding; the first one guar-
antees that once produced a commitment Cm to a message
m, the committer cannot open it to a diﬀerent message m′;
the second one guarantees that the distributions of the com-
mitments to diﬀerent messages are indistinguishable, so one
commitment does not reveal any information about the con-
cealed message. Each of these properties can be achieved ei-
ther computationally or in an information-theoretic sense,
but the information-theoretic version cannot be obtained for
both properties at the same time.
The commitment scheme used in the present work is
Damga˚rd-Fujisaki’s scheme [7], that provides statistically-
hiding and computationally-binding commitments, based
on Abelian groups of hidden order. Given the security pa-
rameters F,B,T , and k, the common parameters are a mod-
ulus n (that can be obtained as an RSA modulus), such that
the order of Z∗n can be upper bounded by 2B, a generator h of
a multiplicative subgroup of high order (the order must be
F-rough) in Z∗n , and a value g = hα, such that the committer
knows neither α nor the order of the subgroups. The com-
mit function of a message x ∈ [−T ,T] with a random value
r ∈ [0, 2B+k] takes the form Cx = gxhr modn.
Additionally, this commitment scheme presents an ad-
ditive homomorphism that allows computing the addition
of two committed numbers (Cx+y = Cx·Cy modn) and the
product of a committed number and a public integer (Cax =
Cax modn).
2.1.2. Interactive proof systems
Interactive proof systems were introduced by Goldwasser
et al. [1]; they are two party protocols in which a prover P
tries to prove a statement x to a verifier V, and both can make
random choices. The two main properties that an interactive
protocol must satisfy are completeness and soundness; the first
one guarantees that a correct prover P can prove all correct
statements to a correct verifier V, and the second guaran-
tees that a cheating prover P ∗ will only succeed in proving a
wrong statement with negligible probability.
A special class of interactive protocols are proofs of
knowledge [8], in which the proved statement is the knowl-
edge of a witness that makes a given binary relation output a
true value, such that a probabilistic algorithm called knowl-
edge extractor exists, and it is able to output a witness for
the common input x using any probabilistic polynomial time
prover P ∗ as an oracle, in polynomial expected time (weak
soundness).
2.1.3. Zero-knowledge protocols
In order for an interactive proof to be zero-knowledge [1], it
must be such that the only knowledge disclosed to the verifier
is the statement that is being proved. More formally, an in-
teractive proof system (P , V) is statistically zero-knowledge
if it exists a probabilistic polynomial algorithm (simulator)
SV such that the conversations produced by the real interac-
tion between P and V are statistically indistinguishable from
the outputs of SV .
2.2. Blind watermark detection
Given a host signal x, a watermark w, and a pair of keys
{Kemb,Kdet} for embedding and detection (they are the same
key in symmetric schemes), a digital blind watermark detec-
tion scheme consists of an embedder that outputs the water-
marked signal y = Embed(x, w,Kemb) and a detector that
takes as parameters a possibly attacked signal z = y + n,
where n represents added noise, the watermark w, and the
detection key Kdet, and it outputs a Boolean value indicat-
ing whether the signal z contains the watermark w, without
using the original host data x.
Three detection algorithms will be compared in terms
of their Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC), namely,
additive spread spectrum with a correlation-based detector
(SS), spread-transform dither modulation without distor-
tion compensation (ST-DM), and additive spread spectrum
with a generalized Gaussian maximum likelihood (ML) de-
tector (GG). In all of them, the host features x are considered













Figure 1: Block diagram of the watermark embedding process for
ST-DM.
i.i.d. with variance σ2X , the watermarked features are denoted
by y = x+w, and z represents the input to the receiver, which
may be corrupted with AWGN noise n, that is considered also
i.i.d with variance σ2N . The binary hypothesis test that must
be solved at the detector is
H0 : z = x + n,
H1 : z = x + w + n.
(1)
Table 1 summarizes the probabilities of false alarm
(Pf ) and missed detection (Pm) for the three detectors
[9–11].
2.2.1. Additive spread spectrum with
correlation-based detector
In SS, the watermark is generated as the product of a pseu-
dorandom vector s, that we will consider a binary sequence
with values {±1} (with norm ‖s‖2 = L) and a perceptual
mask α (that is assumed to be constant to simplify the anal-
ysis), that controls the tradeoﬀ between imperceptibility and
distortion (Dw = (1/L)
∑L
k=1E{w2k} = E{α2k} = α2).
The maximum-likelihood detector for Gaussian dis-









where η is a threshold that depends on the probabilities of
false alarm (Pf ) and missed detection (Pm), as indicated in
Table 1.
2.2.2. Spread transform dither modulation
Given the host features x and the secret spreading sequence
s, which will be considered here binary with values {±1},
the embedding of the watermark in ST-DM [12] (similar to
quantized projection QP [9, 10]) is done as indicated in Fig-
ure 1.
The host features x are correlated with the projection sig-
nal s, and the result (rx) is quantized with an Euclidean scalar
quantizer QΛ(·) of step Δ, that controls the distortion, and
















Figure 2: Block diagram of the watermark detection process for the
GG detector.
Let ρ = (QΛ(rx) − rx); then the watermarked vector is given
by
y = x + w = x + 1
L
ρs. (3)
In order to detect the watermark, the host features, pos-
sibly degraded by AWGN noise n, are correlated with the
spreading sequence s, and the resulting value rz =
∑L
k=1zksk
is quantized and compared to a threshold η to determine











Due to the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), the computed
correlations can be accurately modeled by a Gaussian pdf.
2.2.3. Additive spread spectrum with generalized-Gaussian
features
Figure 2 shows the detection scheme for this case. The host
features are assumed to be the DCT coeﬃcients of an image,
what justifies the generalized Gaussian model with the fol-
lowing pdf:












The embedding procedure is the same as the one de-
scribed for SS. For detection, a preliminary perceptual anal-
ysis provides the estimation of the perceptual mask α that
modulates the inserted secret sequence s. The parameters c
and β are also estimated from the received features. The like-
















where η represents the threshold value used to make the de-
cision.
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LσN )−Q((iΔ + η)/
√
LσN )] 1−Q((η−m1)/σ1)
As shown in [6], the pdfs of l(Y) conditioned to hypothe-
ses H0 and H1 are approximately Gaussian with the same
variance σ21 , and respective means −m1 and m1, that can be
estimated from the watermarked image [6].
2.2.4. Comparison
The three detectors can be compared in terms of robustness
through their Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC), taken
from the formulas in Table 1. The correlation-based detec-
tor is only optimum when c = 2, and when c /= 2, the gen-
eralized Gaussian detector outperforms it; ST-DM can out-
perform both for a suﬃciently high DWR (Data to Water-
mark Ratio, DWR = 10log10(σ2X/σ2W )), due to its host rejec-
tion capabilities. However, the performance of the general-
ized Gaussian detector and the ST-DM one are not much far
apart when c is near 1 and the DWR in the projected domain
(DWRp = DWR − 10 log10L) is low. Figure 3 shows a plot
of the ROC for fixed DWR and WNR (Watermark to Noise
Ratio, WNR = 10 log10(σ2W/σ2N )), with a features shape pa-
rameter of c = 0.8, that has been chosen as an example of
a relatively common value for the distribution of AC DCT
coeﬃcients of most images. It is remarkable that even when
the exact c is not used, and it is below 1, the performance of
the GG detector with c = 0.5 is much better than that of the
correlation-based one, and its ROC remains near the ST-DM
ROC.
Regarding the resilience against sensitivity attacks, it can
be shown that the correlation-based detector and the ST-DM
one make the watermarking scheme very easy to break when
the attacker has access to the output of the detector, as the
detection boundaries for both methods are just hyperplanes;
Figure 4 shows the two-dimensional detection regions for
each of the three methods. On the other hand, the detec-
tion function in the GG detector when c < 1 (Figure 4(c))
presents the property that component-wise modifications
produce bounded increments; that is, when modifying one
component of the host signal Y , the increment produced in
the likelihood function (6) is bounded by |αksk|c indepen-













This means that it is not possible to get a signal in the
boundary by modifying a single component (or a number N
of components such that
∑
N |αksk|c is less than the gap to η),
opposed to a correlation detector, in which just making one
component big (or small) enough can get the signal out of
the detection region. This property can make very diﬃcult













GG c = 1
GG c = 0.5
Figure 3: Theoretical ROC curves for the studied detectors under
AWGN attacks, with DWR = 20 dB, WNR = 0 dB, L = 1000, and
generalized Gaussian distributed host features with c = 0.8.
In order to quantitatively compare the resilience of the
three detectors against sensitivity attacks, we will take as ro-
bustness criterion the number of calls to the detector needed
for reaching an attack distortion equal to that of the water-
mark (NWR = 0 dB). This choice is supported by the fact that
for an initially nonmarked host x in which a watermark w has
been inserted, yielding y, it is always possible to find a vector
z in the boundary whose distortion with respect to y is less
than the power of the watermark (e.g., taking the intersection
between the detection boundary and the line that connects x
and y). Thus, a sensitivity attack can always reach a point
with NWR = 0 dB. In general, it is not guaranteed that an at-
tack can reach a lower NWR. Furthermore, given that for a
blind detection the original nonmarked host is not known,
imposing a more restrictive fidelity criterion for the attacker
than for the embedder makes no sense. In light of the previ-
ous discussion, we can consider that a watermark has been
eﬀectively erased when a point z is found, whose distortion
with respect to y is equal to the power of the embedded wa-
termark w; the number of iterations that a sensitivity attack
needs to reach this point can thus be used for determining
the robustness of the detector against the attack.
We have taken blind newton sensitivity attack (BNSA
[4]; an RRP-compliant description of BNSA can be found in
[13]) as a powerful representative of sensitivity attacks, and
simulated its execution against the three studied detectors.
Each iteration of this algorithm calls the detector a number
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4: Two-dimensional detection boundaries for ST-DM (a),
correlation-based detector (b), and GG detector (c).
of times proportional to the number of dimensions of the
involved signals. The results show that both ST-DM and the
correlation detector are completely broken in just one iter-
ation of the algorithm, independently of the dimensionality
of the signals, so the attack needs O(L) calls to the detector
in order to succeed (achieving not only a point with NWR <
0 dB, but also convergence to the nearest point in the bound-
ary). This is due to their simple detection boundaries, that
have a constant gradient. Figure 5 shows the NWR of the at-
tack as a function of the number of calls to the detector, for
the three detectors, using DWR = 16 dB and Pf= 10−4, as a
result of averaging 100 random executions. The GG detector
is used with two diﬀerent shape factors, c = 0.5 and c = 1.5;
the number of iterations needed to break the detector in both
cases is bigger than for the correlation detectors, due to the
more involved detection boundary, but this eﬀect is more ev-
ident when c < 1, case in which the detector has the afore-
mentioned property of bounded increments for component-
wise modifications at the input.
The involved detection boundary of the generalized
Gaussian ML detector makes the number of iterations
needed for achieving convergence grow also with the dimen-
sionality of the host. This means that the number of calls to
the detector needed to get a certain target distortion is not
only higher for the GG detector, but it also grows faster than
for the other detectors with the dimensionality of the host
(Figure 6) for fixed WNR and Pf . We have found empirically
that the number of calls needed for reaching NWR = 0 dB
is approximately O(L1.5). Furthermore, if we took as robust-
ness criterion the absolute convergence of the algorithm (not
only achieving NWR = 0 dB), the advantage of the GG detec-
tor is even better both in number of iterations and in number
of calls to the detector; that is, while for the GG detector con-
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Figure 5: NWR for a sensitivity attack (BNSA) as a function of
number of calls to the detector for correlation detector (Cox), ST-
DM, and generalized Gaussian (GG) with c = 0.5, and c = 1.5 for
































GG c = 1.5
GG c = 0.5
Figure 6: Number of calls to the detector for a sensitivity attack
(BNSA) for reaching NWR = 0 dB as a function of the dimensional-
ity of the watermark for correlation detector (Cox), ST-DM, and
generalized Gaussian (GG) with c = 0.5 and c = 1.5 for DWR
= 16 dB and Pf= 10−4.
NWR = 0 dB, for correlation detectors BNSA achieves both
NWR < 0 dB and convergence in just one iteration.
2.3. Zero-knowledge watermark detection
The use of zero-knowledge protocols in watermark detec-
tion was first issued by Craver [14], and later formalized
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by Adelsbach et al. [2, 15]. The formal definition of a zero-
knowledge watermark detection scheme concreted for a
blind detection mechanism can be stated as follows.
Definition 1 (Zero-knowledge Watermark Detection). Given
a secure commitment scheme with the operations Com()
and Open(), and a blind watermarking scheme with the
operations Embed() and Detect(), the watermarked host
data z and the commitments on the watermark Cw and
key CKw (for a keyed scheme), with their respective pub-
lic parameters parcom = (parwcom, parKwcom), a zero-knowledge
blind watermark detection protocol for this watermarking
scheme is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge between a
prover P and a verifier V where on common input x :=


























Adelsbach and Sadeghi introduced in [2] a zero-
knowledge watermark detection protocol for the Cox et al.
[16] detection scheme, that consists in a normalized
correlation-detector for spread spectrum. In [17], they have
studied the communication complexity of the non-blind
protocol, that is much less eﬃcient than the blind one, due
to the higher number of committed operations that must be
undertaken. Later, Piva et al. also developed a ZK watermark
detection protocol for ST-DM in [5].
3. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE SUBPROOFS
The proofs that are employed in the previous zero-
knowledge detectors and in the generalized Gaussian one
are shown in Table 2 with their respective communica-
tion complexity, which has been calculated when applied to
the Damga˚rd-Fujisaki commitment scheme [7] as a func-
tion of the security parameters F,B,T and k, defined in
Section 2.1.1.
The first five proofs are already existing zero-knowledge
proofs for the opening of a commitment [7] (PKop), the
equality of two commitments [18] (PKeq), the square of a
commitment [18] (PKsq), a commitment is inside an inter-
val [18] (PKint) and nonnegativity of a commitment [19]
(PK≥0).
All these proofs are just simple operations, but the lack of
some operations like the computation of the absolute value
or the square root, both necessary for the first implementa-
tion of the GG ML detector, led us to the development of the
last two zero-knowledge proofs; PKsqrt represents a proof that
a committed integer is the rounded square root of another
committed integer, and it is based on a mapping of quan-
tized square roots into integers. PKabs allows the application
of the absolute value operator to a committed number, with-
out disclosing the magnitude nor the sign of that number.
Both proofs are described in the following.
3.1. Zero-knowledge proof that a committed
integer is the rounded square root of another
committed integer
Adelsbach et al. presented in [20] a proof for a generic func-
tion approximation whose inverse can be eﬃciently proven,
covering, for example, divisions and square roots. Here, we
present a specific protocol for proving a rounded square
root that follows a similar philosophy, we study its commu-
nication complexity and propose a mapping (presented in
Appendix A) that makes possible this zero-knowledge proto-
col to prove the correct calculation of square roots on com-
mitted integers (not necessarily perfect square residues):
PKsqrt
[






Let Cy be the commitment to the integer whose square
root must be calculated. The protocol that prover and verifier
would follow is the next.
(1) First, the prover calculates the value x = round(√y),
its commitment Cx, and the commitment to its
squared value Cx2 , and sends both commitments and
Cy to the verifier.
(2) The prover proves in zero-knowledge that Cx2 contains
the squared value of the integer hidden in Cx, through
PK{x, r1, r2 : Cx = gxhr1 modn, Cx2 = gx2hr2 modn}.
(3) Then, the prover must prove that x2 ∈ [y − x, y + x],
using a modified version of Boudot’s proof [18] with
hidden interval, that consists in considering also ran-
domness in the commitments of the interval limits cal-
culated by both parties at the first step of the proof.
Using this interval instead of the one indicated in
Appendix A, the zero values are also accepted with no
ambiguity when the maximum allowable value for y is
below the order of the group generated by g. The coun-
terpart is that there are two possibilities for the square
root of integers of the form k2 + k, with k an integer,
namely k and k + 1. The eﬀect of this relaxation on the
conditions imposed before is a small rise in the round-
ing error, smaller as k grows; if we take into account
that the numbers that are considered integers are actu-
ally the quantization of real numbers using a step that
is fixed by the precision of the system, the error is of the
same order as this precision. Nevertheless, the need of
working with null values without disclosing any infor-
mation forces us to make this adaptation.
(4) At last, it is necessary to prove that x ∈ [0,√m], if
m is the order of the subgroup generated by g. If it
is known—by the initialization of the commitment
scheme—that log2(m) = l, then proving that x ∈
[0, 2l/2−1] is enough; if the working range for the com-
mitted integers is [−T ,T], with T < √m (as it will
be if the bit length of T is at most l/2 − 1), then it
suﬃces with the proof that x is in the working range:
x ∈ [0,T].
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Table 2: Zero-knowledge subproofs and their communication complexity.
Proof CompPK (bits)
PKop[m, r : Cm = gmhr modn] 3|F| + |T| + 2B + 3k + 2
PKeq[m, r1, r2 : C
(1)
m = gm1 hr11 modn∧ C(2)m = gm2 hr22 modn] 4|F| + |T| + 2B + 5k + 3
PKsq[m, r1, r2 : Cm = gm1 hr11 modn∧ gm22 hr22 modn] 4|F| + |T| + 3B + 5k + 3
PKint[m, r : Cm = gmhr modn∧m ∈ [a, b]] 25|F| + 5|T| + 10B + 27k + 2|n| + 20
PK≥0[m, r : Cm = gmhr modn∧m ≥ 0] 11|F| + 4|T| + 12B + 14k + 9
PKsqrt[m, r1, r2 : Cm = gmhr1 modn∧ Cn√m = gn
√
mhr2 modn] 48|F| + 9|T| + 18B + 53k + 6|n| + 39
PKabs[m, r1, r2 : Cm = gmhr1 modn∧ C|m| = g |m|hr2 modn] 19|F| + 6|T| + 16B + 24k + 15
Claim 1. The presented interactive proof is computationally
sound and statistically zero-knowledge in the random oracle
model.
A sketch of the proof for this claim is given in Appen-
dix C.
The communication complexity of this protocol is shown
in Table 2.
3.2. Zero-knowledge proof that a committed integer is
the absolute value of another committed integer
This proof is a zero-knowledge protocol that allows the appli-
cation of the absolute value operator to a committed number,








As in a residue group Zq there is no notion of “sign,” we





















taking into account that −x ≡ q − xmod q, the mapping is
consistent.
Let Cx = gx1hr11 modn be the commitment to a num-
ber x, whose sign is not known by the verifier, and C|x| =
g |x|2 h
r2
2 modn the commitment to a number which is claimed
to be the absolute value of x. The scheme of the protocol is as
follows:
(1) both prover and verifier calculate the commitment to
the opposite of x, with the help of the homomorphic
properties of the commitment scheme:
C−x = C−1x ; (11)
(2) next, the prover must demonstrate that the value hid-
den in C|x| corresponds to the value hidden in one
of the previous commitments Cx,C−x, using the ZK
proof of knowledge described in Appendix B;
(3) at last, the prover demonstrates that the value hidden
in C|x| is |x| ≥ 0, using the protocol proposed by Lip-
maa [19].
Claim 2. The presented interactive proof is computationally
sound and statistically zero-knowledge in the random oracle
model.
A sketch of the proof for this claim can be found in
Appendix C.
The communication complexity of this protocol is given
in Table 2.
4. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE GG WATERMARK DETECTOR
The zero-knowledge version of the generalized Gaussian de-
tector conceals the secret pseudorandom signal sk using the
Damga˚rd-Fujisaki scheme [7] Csk . The supposedly water-
marked image Yk is publicly available, so the perceptual anal-
ysis (αk) and the extraction of the parameters βk and ck can
be done in the public domain, as well as the estimation of the
threshold η for a given point in the ROC. In this first imple-
mentation, only shape factors c = 1 or c = 0.5 are allowed,
so the employed ck will be the nearest to the estimated shape

























and the comparison with the threshold η, without disclosing
sk.
The protocol executed by prover and verifier so as to
prove that the given image Yk is watermarked with the se-
quence hidden in Csk is the following:
(1) prover and verifier calculate the commitment to Ak =






(2) next, the prover generates a commitment C|Ak| to the
absolute value of Ak, sends it to the verifier, and proves
in zero-knowledge that it hides the absolute value of
the commitment CAk , through the developed proof
PKabs (Section 3.2);
(3) if c = 1 (Laplacian features) then the operation
|Ak|c is not needed, so, just for the sake of notation
CBk = C|Ak|. If c = 0.5, the rounded square root of
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|Ak| must be calculated by the prover; then he gen-
erates the commitment CBk = C√|Ak|, sends it to the
verifier and proves in zero-knowledge the validity of
the square root calculation, through the proof PKsqrt
(Section 3.1);
(4) both prover and verifier can independently calculate
the value βckk and |Yk|ck , and complete the commit-
ted calculation of the sum D = ∑k βckk (|Yk|ck − Bk),











(5) finally, the prover must demonstrate in zero-
knowledge that D > η, or equivalently, that D − η > 0,
which can be done by running the proof of knowledge
by Lipmaa [19] on Cth = CDg−η.
5. IMPROVED GG DETECTOR WITH BINARY
ANTIPODAL SPREADING SEQUENCE (GGBA)
When the spreading sequence sk is a binary antipodal se-
quence, so it takes only values {±s}, we can apply a trivial





































































































In (15), we use the fact that sk can only be given a value s
or −s in order to substitute the indicator function 1{s}(sk) =
(1/2s)(s + sk) and 1{−s}(sk) = (1/2s)(s− sk).
The factors termed as G and Hk in (16) can be computed
in the clear-text domain, working with floating-point preci-
sion arithmetic, and then have their commitments generated.
This implies that all the nonlinear operations are transferred
to the clear-text domain, greatly reducing the communica-
tion overhead, as will be shown in Section 7; only additions
and multiplications must be performed in the encrypted do-
main, and they can be undertaken through the homomor-
phic properties of the commitment scheme. This transfer-
ence also diminishes the computational load, as clear-text
operations are much more eﬃcient than modular operations
in a large ring.
The zero-knowledge protocol can be reduced to the fol-
lowing two steps.









(2) The prover demonstrates the presence of the water-
mark by running the zero-knowledge proof that D −
η > 0.
The number of needed proofs during the protocol is
reduced to only one, what propitiates the aforementioned
reduction in computation and communication complexity,
with the additional advantage that this scheme can be applied
to any value of the shape parameter ck, so it will be preferred
to the previous one unless sk is not binary antipodal.
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE GG
DETECTION PROTOCOLS
After presenting the protocols for the zero-knowledge imple-
mentation of the generalized Gaussian ML detector, we can
state the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The developed detection protocols for the general-
ized Gaussian detector are computationally sound and statisti-
cally zero-knowledge.
A sketch of the proof for this theorem can be found in
Appendix C.
The reformulation of the generalized Gaussian protocol
deserves two comments concerning security. The first one in-
volves the nonlinear operations that were performed under
encryption in Section 4, which are now transferred to the
public clear-text domain. Although this could seem at first
sight a knowledge leakage, currently it is not; all those oper-
ations can be performed with the same public parameters as
in Section 4 in a feasible time, so the parameters G and Hk
that are publicly calculated in this protocol could also be ob-
tained in the previous version, and their disclosure gives no
extra knowledge.
The second comment deals with the correlation form of
the reformulation, and its resilience to blind sensitivity at-
tacks. Even when the operation performed in the encrypted
domain is a correlation, the additive term (G) is what pre-
serves the bounded-increment property, by virtue of which
component-wise modifications of the input signal only pro-
duce bounded increments on the likelihood function:
−αc ≤ ∣∣Yk
∣
∣c − ∣∣Yk − αsk
∣
∣c ≤ αc, c < 1. (18)
The result of the addition is not disclosed during the pro-
tocol; thus, the correlation cannot be known even when the
term G is public, and both terms cannot be decoupled, so
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no extra knowledge is learned from G, and the diﬃculty for
finding points in the detection boundary, that is a necessary
step for sensitivity attacks, remains, as well as the shape of the
detection regions, unaltered.
7. EFFICIENCY AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
We will measure the eﬃciency of the developed protocols in
terms of their communication complexity, as this parameter
is what entails the bottleneck of the system, and it is easily
quantifiable given the complexity measures calculated in the
previous sections for each of the subprotocols.
Taking into account the plot of the raw protocol
(Section 4), a total of 2L commitments (with a length |n|) are
interchanged, namely the L commitments that correspond to
the secret pseudorandom sequence s and the L commitments
to |Ak|, while in the GGBA detector (Section 5) only the L
commitments to s are sent; the rest of the commitments are
either calculated using homomorphic computation or are al-
ready included in the complexity of the subprotocols.
Thus, the total communication complexity for the detec-
tor applied to Laplacian distributed features and c = 0.5 in
the first scheme, as well as the complexity for the improved
GGBA detector can be expressed as
CompZKWDGG(c=1)








= (L + 1)|n| + L·CompPKop + CompPK≥0 .
(19)
In every calculation, L proofs of knowledge of the open-
ing of the initial commitments have been added, as even
when they are not explicitly mentioned in the sketch of the
protocols, they are needed to protect the verifier.
In order to reduce the total time spent during the inter-
action, it is possible to convert the whole protocol in a non-
interactive one, following the procedure described in [21],
keeping the condition that the parameters for the commit-
ment scheme must not be chosen by the prover, or he would
be able to fake all the proofs. In addition to the reduction in
interaction time, the use of this technique also overcomes the
necessity of a honest verifier that some subprotocols impose.
The calculated complexity for Piva et al.’s ST-DM detec-
tor and Adelsbach and Sadeghi’s blind correlation-based de-
tector is the following:
CompZKWDSTDM
= (L + 1)|n| + L·CompPKop + CompPKint ,
CompZKWDSS
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Figure 7: Communication complexity in kB for the studied proto-
cols.
As a numeric example, in Figure 7 the evolution of the
communication complexity for every protocol is compared
using |F| = 80, |n| = 1024, B = 1024, T= 2256 and k = 40,
for growing L. All the protocols have complexity O(L). The
two protocols for generalized Gaussian host features with
c = 1 and c = 0.5 have a higher complexity, due to the
operations that cannot be computed by making use of the
homomorphic property of the commitment scheme (abso-
lute value and square root). Nevertheless, their complexity is
comparable to that of the zero-knowledge non-blind detec-
tion protocol developed by Adelsbach et al. [17].
On the other hand, the zero-knowledge GGBA detec-
tor achieves the lowest communication complexity of all the
studied protocols, even lower than the previous correlation-
based protocols, with the increased protection against blind
sensitivity attacks when c < 1 is used, being this the first ben-
efit of the reformulated algorithm.
Furthermore, the communication complexity of the pro-
tocol is constant if we discard the initial transmission of the
commitments for the spreading sequence and their corre-
sponding proofs of opening; once this step is performed, the
protocol can be applied to several watermarked works for
proving the presence of the same watermark with a (small)
constant communication complexity.
Regarding computation complexity, the original detec-
tion algorithm (without the addition of the zero-knowledge
protocol) for the generalized Gaussian is more expensive
than ST-DM or Cox’s (normalized) linear correlator, due to
its nonlinear operations. The use of zero-knowledge pro-
duces an increase in computation complexity, as, addition-
ally to the calculation and verification of the proofs, homo-
morphic computation involves modular products and expo-
nentiations in a large ring, so clear-text operations have al-
most negligible complexity in comparison with encrypted
operations.
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The second benefit of the presented GGBA zero-
knowledge protocol is that all the nonlinear operations are
transferred from the encrypted domain (where they must be
performed using proofs of knowledge) to the clear-text pub-
lic domain; thus, all the operations that made the symmetric
protocol more expensive than the correlation-based detec-
tors can be neglected in comparison with the encrypted oper-
ations, so the computation complexity of the zero-knowledge
GGBA protocol will be roughly the same as the one for the
correlation-based zero-knowledge detectors.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The presented zero-knowledge watermark detection pro-
tocol based on generalized Gaussian ML detector outper-
forms the previous correlation-based zero-knowledge de-
tectors implemented to date in terms of robustness against
blind sensitivity attacks, while improving on the ROC of the
correlation-based spread-spectrum detector with a perfor-
mance that is near that of ST-DM.
If the employed spreading sequence is a binary antipodal
sequence, the protocol can be restated in a much more eﬃ-
cient way, reaching a communication complexity that is even
lower than that of the previous correlation-based protocols,
while keeping its robustness against sensitivity attacks.
Two zero-knowledge proofs for square root calculation
and absolute value have been presented. They serve as build-
ing blocks for the zero-knowledge implementation of the
generalized Gaussian ML detector, and also allow for the en-
crypted execution of these two nonlinear operations in other
high level protocols.
Finally, the use of the technique shown in [21] makes
the whole protocol noninteractive, so that it does not need
a honest verifier to achieve the zero-knowledge property. In
order to get protection against cheating provers, the proofs
shown in [22] can be employed to prove some statistical
properties of the inserted watermark, resulting in an increase
in communication complexity.
APPENDICES
A. MAPPING FOR ROUNDED SQUARE ROOT
Current cryptosystems are based in modular operations in a
group of high order. Although simple operations like addi-
tion or multiplication have a direct mapping from quantized
real numbers to modular arithmetic (provided that the num-
ber of elements inside the used group is big enough to avoid
the eﬀect of the modulus), when trying to cope with non-
integer operations, like divisions or square roots, problems
arise.
In the following, a mapping that represents quantized
square roots inside integers in the range {1, . . . ,n− 1} is pre-
sented, and existence and uniqueness of the solutions for this
mapping are derived. The target is to find which conditions
must be satisfied by the input and the output to keep this
operation secure when the arguments are concealed.
The mapping must be such that if y ∈ Z+ and x = √y ∈
R, then n
√
y := round(x). For this mapping to behave like
the conventional square root for positive reals, it is necessary
to bound the domain where it can be applied. The formaliza-




= {y ∈ Z+ | y < n} −→ B = {x ∈ Z+|x < round(√n)}
y −→ x =n√y = round(√y).
(A.1)
In order for this definition to be valid, and given that
the elements with which this mapping works are just the
representatives of the residue classes of Zn in the interval
{1, . . . ,n− 1}, we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Existence and uniqueness of a solution). A unique
x ∈ [1, xm]∩ Z+ exists, such that for all y ∈ {1, . . . , min(x2m +
xm,n− 1)}, xm ≤ √n − 1,
x2 modn ∈ [y − x, y + x)n, x ≤ y, (A.2)
where [, )n represents the modular reduction of the given inter-
val.
Proof.
Existence. Given y ∈ Z+, its real square root admits a unique
decomposition as an integer and a decimal in this way:
√
y = x + d, x = round(√y) ∈ Z+, d ∈ [−0.5, 0.5).
(A.3)
Squaring the previous expression, both sides of the equal-
ity must be integers, so,
(
√
y)2 = x2 + d2 + 2dx
x2 = y − 2dx − d2, (A.4)
and taking into account that y is integer, 2dx + d2 must be
also an integer, and it is bounded by
2dx + d2 ∈ [−x + 0.25, x + 0.25) =⇒ 2dx + d2 ∈ [−x + 1, x].
(A.5)
Substituting this last equation in the previous one gives
the desired result:
x2 ∈ [y − x, y + x − 1]. (A.6)
Thus, the modular reduction of x2 is inside the modular
reduction of the interval, and x exists.
Uniqueness. Here uniqueness is concerned with modular op-
erations, and the possibility that the interval [y−x, y+x) in-
clude integers out of the initial representing range {0, . . . ,n−
1}, which would result in ambiguities after applying the mod
operator. In the following, all the operations are modular,
and thus, the mod operator is omitted. The intervals also rep-
resent their modular reduction.
The proof is based on reductio ad absurdum. Let y ∈
{1, . . . , x2m + xm}, and let x, x′ ∈ [1, xm] ∩ Z+ two diﬀerent
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integers such that both fulfill x=n√y, x′=n√y. This means
that
x2 ∈ [y − x, y + x)∩ Z,
x′2 ∈ [y − x′, y + x′)∩ Z. (A.7)
Combining the previous relations, x and x′ must be such
that
x2 − x′2 ∈ (−x − x′, x + x′)∩ Z. (A.8)
Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that x > x′. If
both x, x′ are less than xm ≤ √n − 1, then their squares
are below n, and follow the same behavior as if no modular
operation were applied. Squares in Z can be represented by
the following recursive formula:
yk = k2 = yk−1 + k + k − 1 =⇒






2(k − l) + k + i, k > i
0, k = i,
(A.9)
what means that in order for x2 and x′2 to be spaced less that
x + x′ the next inequality must be satisfied:
x′−x−1∑
l=1
2(x − l) + x + x′ < x + x′ =⇒
x−x′−1∑
l=1
2(x − l) < 0.
(A.10)
Thus, the only solution is x = x′.
If, on the other hand, x = xm, and taking into account
that
x2 ∈ [y − x, y + x − 1] ⇐⇒ y ∈ [x2 − x + 1, x2 + x],
(A.11)
there are two possibilities.
(1) y ∈ {x2 − x + 1, . . . ,n − 1}: if x /= x′, then x′ <
round(
√
n), so the range (x′2 − x′, x′2 + x′] cannot include
y, and x is the only admissible solution.
(2) y ∈ {1, . . . , x2+x−n}: this is only possible if x2m+xm >
n; in such case, given the condition imposed on xm, then
y ≤ x2m + xm − n ≤
√
n
2 − 1 + xm − n = xm − 1. (A.12)
As x = xm, this means that y < x, which violates one of
the conditions established at the beginning.
One issue in the previous exposition is that it is pos-
sible that the mapping is not defined over the entire set
{1, . . . ,n − 1}. Instead, if the modulus is not public, the full
working range is not known, and it becomes necessary to up-
per bound the integers with which the system will work. In
this case, the upper bound can be set to ym = x2m + xm, and
the mapping can be applied to the full working range; fur-
thermore, the condition that x ≤ y can be eliminated, as
x ∈ {1, . . . , xm} already guarantees that there is no ambiguity.
A similar reasoning can be applied when the working















In this case, it is enough if x ∈ {1, . . . , round(√n/2)}, and
y ∈ {1, . . . , n/2 − 1}, as x2 covers all the range of positive
numbers in which y is included, and there are no ambiguities
with the mod operation, as the overlap in intervals can only
be produced with negative numbers, already discarded by the
previous conditions.
Limiting the working range is the biggest issue of this
method; with sequential modular additions and multiplica-
tions in Zn, it is only needed that the result of applying the
same sequence of operations (without applying the modu-
lus) in Z belongs to the interval {1, . . . ,n − 1} to reach the
same value with modular operations. In the case of the de-
fined square root, it is necessary that the operations made
before applying a root also return a number inside the inter-
val {1, . . . ,n− 1}, and it is not enough that the final result of
all the computation is in this interval.
B. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF THAT A
COMMITMENT HIDES THE SAME VALUE AS
ONE OF TWO GIVEN COMMITMENTS
This proof constitutes a mixture of a variation of the proof of
equality of two commitments [18] and the technique shown
in [23] to produce an OR proof through the application of
secret sharing schemes.
Given three commitments Cx1 = gx11 hr11 , Cx2 = gx22 hr22 and
Cx = gxhr , the prover states that x = x1 or that x = x2. The
notation used for the security parameters (B,T , k,F = C(k))
is the same as in Section 2.1.1; the structure of the proof is
the following.
(1) Let us suppose that xi = x, and xj /= x, with i, j ∈
{1, 2}, i /= j. Then, for xj , the prover must generate the values
Wj1 = gujj huj1j C−ejxj ,
Wj2 = guj huj2C−ejx ,
(B.1)
such that ej is a randomly chosen t-bit integer (ej ∈
[0,C(k))), uj is randomly chosen in [0,C(k)T2k) and uj1 and
uj2 are randomly chosen in [0,C(k)2B+2k).
For xi, the prover chooses at random yi ∈ [1,C(k)T2k)
and ri3, ri4 ∈ [0,C(k)2B+2k), and constructs
Wi1 = g yii hri3i ,
Wi2 = g yihri4 .
(B.2)
Then, the prover sends to the verifier the values W11,
W12, W21, W22.
(2) The verifier generates a random t-bit number s ∈
[0,C(k)), and sends it to the prover.
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(3) The prover calculates the remaining challenge apply-
ing an XOR ei = ej ⊕ s, and then generates the following
values:
ui = yi + eix,
ui1 = ri3 + eiri,
ui2 = ri4 + eir,
(B.3)
and sends to the verifier e1,u1,u11,u12, e2,u2,u21,u22.
(4) The verifier checks that the challenges e1, e2 are con-
sistent with his random key s (s = e1 ⊕ e2), and then checks,








The completeness of the proof follows from its definition,
as if one of the xk is equal to x, then all the subproofs will
succeed.
The soundness of the protocol resides in the key s, that is
generated by the verifier. This protocol can be decomposed
in two parts, each one consisting in the proof that x = xi for
each xi. Both are based in a protocol that is demonstrated to
be sound [18]. So, without access to ei at the first stage, the
only way for the prover to generate the correct values with
nonnegligible probability is that xi = x; if xi /= x, he must
generate ei in advance for making that the proof succeeds.
With this premise, one of the ei must be fixed by the prover,
and he indirectly commits to it in the first stage of the pro-
tocol; but the other value ej is determined by ei and by the
random choice of the verifier s, so for the prover it is as ran-
dom as s, guaranteeing that the second proof will only suc-
ceed with negligible probability when xj = x.
The protocol is witness hiding, due to the followed proce-
dure for developing it [23]; thanks to the statistically hiding
property of the commitments, all the values generated for the
false proof will be indistinguishable from those of the true
proof. Furthermore, the protocol is also zero-knowledge, as
a simulator can be built that given the random choices (s)
of the verifier can construct both proofs applying the same
trick as for the false proof, and the distribution of the re-
sulting commitments will be statistically indistinguishable
from that of the real interactions; in fact, the original proto-
col was honest-verifier zero-knowledge, but adding the addi-
tional XOR on the verifier’s random choice for the true proof
makes that the resulting value is completely random, at least
if one of the parties is honest (it is like a fair coin flip), so the
zero-knowledge property is gained in this process.
Applying the technique shown in [21], the previous pro-
tocol can be transformed in a noninteractive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge, by using a hash function H , so that
s = H(W11‖W12‖W21‖W22), and eliminating the transmis-

















In this appendix, we have included the sketches of the secu-
rity proofs for the developed protocols.
C.1. Sketch of the proof for Claim 1
Completeness and soundness of the protocol in Section 3.1
are held upon the validity of the mapping of Appendix A.
Proof.
Completeness. If both prover and verifier behave according to
the protocol in Section 3.1, then the verifier will accept all the
subproofs and all its tests will succeed. If x is generated as the
rounded square root of y, the square proof and both range
proofs will be accepted because of the validity of the mapping
of Appendix A and the completeness of these subproofs.
Soundness. Taking into account the consideration about inte-
gers of the form k2 + k, the binding property of the commit-
ment guarantees that the prover cannot open the generated
Cx and Cx2 to incorrect values; thus, appealing to the unique-
ness property of the mapping of Appendix A, the computa-
tional soundness of the range and squaring subproofs guar-
antees that a proof for a value that does not fulfill that map-
ping will only succeed with negligible probability.
Zero-knowledge. We can construct a simulator SV
∗
for the
verifier’s view of the interaction. SV
∗
must generate values Cx
andCx2 as commitments to random values, that will be statis-
tically indistinguishable from the true commitments, due to
the statistically hiding property of the commitment scheme.
Furthermore, the statistical zero-knowledge property of the
squaring and range subproofs guarantees that simulators for
these proofs exist and generate the correct views, and the gen-
eration of Cx and Cx2 does not aﬀect these views, due to their
indistinguishability with respect to the true commitments,
and that the simulators do not need knowledge of the com-
mitted values in order to succeed.
C.2. Sketch of the proof for Claim 2
Proof.
Completeness. If both parties adhere to the protocol, then
when C|x| hides the absolute value of the number concealed
in Cx, the protocol always succeeds due to the completeness
of the OR proof and the nonnegativity proof.
Soundness. Due to the binding property of the commitments,
the prover cannot open Cx and C|x| to incorrect values. Fur-
thermore, due to the soundness of the subproofs, if C|x| hides
a negative number, the proof in step (3) will fail, so the com-
plete protocol will fail (except with negligible probability); on
the other hand, if C|x| does not hide a number with the same
absolute value as the one hidden by Cx, the proof in step (2)
will also fail (except with negligible probability). Thus, the
whole protocol will only succeed for a non-valid input with
a negligible probability given by the soundness error of the
proofs in steps (2) and (3).
Zero-knowledge. We can construct a simulator SV
∗
such that
the real interactions have a probability distribution indis-
tinguishable from that of the outputs of the simulator. The
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statistical zero-knowledge property of the OR and nonnega-
tivity subproofs guarantees that simulators exist that can pro-
duce sequences that are statistically indistinguishable from
these protocols’ outputs, so the only quantity that the simu-
lator SV
∗
has to produce is C−x, whose true value can be gen-
erated directly from Cx due to the homomorphic property of
the used commitment scheme. Thus, the whole protocol is
statistically zero-knowledge.
C.3. Sketch of the proof for Theorem 1
Proof.
Completeness. Let us assume that both parties behave accord-
ing to the protocol. The values CAk calculated by the correct
prover and the correct verifier coincide. For correctly pro-
duced C|Ak|, the completeness of the absolute value subproof
guarantees the acceptance of the verifier; equally, the com-
pleteness of the rounded square root subproof guarantees the
acceptance for a correctly calculated CBk . Next, the values of
CD computed by both parties coincide, and, finally, due to
the completeness of the nonnegativity proof, the verifier will
accept the whole proof in case the signal {Yk} is inside the
detection region. For the case of a binary antipodal spread-
ing sequence (Section 5), if the values G, Hk and Cth are cor-
rectly calculated, the completeness of the nonnegativity proof
guarantees the acceptance when {Yk} is inside the detection
region. This concludes the completeness proof.
Soundness. The binding property of the commitments as-
sures that the prover will not be able to open the commit-
ments that he calculates (CAk , C|Ak|, CBk , CD, Cth) to wrong
values. Furthermore, the statistical soundness of the used
subproofs (absolute value, rounded square root, and non-
negativity) guarantees that an incorrect input in any of them
will only succeed with negligible probability. This fact, to-
gether with the homomorphic properties of the commit-
ments, that makes impossible for the prover to fake the arith-
metic operations performed in parallel by the verifier, propi-
tiates that the probability that a signal {Y∗k } that is not inside
the detection region succeeds the proof be negligible.
Zero-knowledge. We can construct a simulator SV
∗
such that
the real interactions have a probability distribution indis-
tinguishable from that of the outputs of the simulator. The
statistical zero-knowledge property of the absolute value,
rounded square root and nonnegativity subproofs guaran-
tee the existence of simulators for their outputs; thus, SV
∗
can generate CAk , CD, and Cth as in a real execution of the
protocol, thanks to the homomorphic properties of the com-
mitment scheme. On the other hand, it must generate C|Ak|
and CBk as commitments to random numbers; the statis-
tical hiding property of the commitments guarantees that
the distribution of these random commitments be indistin-
guishable from the true commitments. Furthermore, these
generated values will not aﬀect the indistinguishability of
the simulators for the subproofs, as these simulators do not
need knowledge of the committed values in order to succeed.
Thus, the output of SV
∗
is indistinguishable from true inter-
actions of an accepting protocol, and the whole protocol is
statistically zero-knowledge.
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